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F-08-01111

April 12, 2008

Scott A. Koch
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

APPROVED FOR RELEASE ☐
DATE: 18-Aug-2010

Re: FOIA Request – Agent Recruitment guidelines and risk analysis reports


Dear Mr. Koch:

This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq., for copies of any internal Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) documents and reports pertaining to guidelines for National Clandestine Service officers for the evaluation of the likelihood of success of recruiting agents from within terrorist organizations, including but not limited to any risk or probability analysis reports based on quantified variables used to determine the probability of successful recruitment efforts.

This request falls under the educational and scientific fee category, as this material will be used in the development of a risk analysis report for an academic journal. I have attached the first four pages of the current report as an exemplar, as well as an illustration of the type of information I am seeking. I desire to compare the methodology developed by my colleague and me with a comparable product from the U.S. Intelligence Community (“USIC”) before submitting the final analytical report for publication with the hope that it will aid in the prosecution of the USIC’s ongoing Counter-Terrorism mission.

If you deny all or part of this request, please cite the specific exemptions you believe justify your refusal to release the information or permit the review and notify me of your appeal procedures available under the law. In excising material, please “black out” rather than “white out” or “cut out.”

Please respond to this request within 20 working days as provided for by law. Failure to comply in a timely manner may result in the filing of a civil action against your agency in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Your cooperation in this matter would be appreciated. If you wish to discuss this request, please do not hesitate to contact me by e-mail at kellybmcc@gmail.com or on my cell at 301-728-5908.



Kel McClanahan

APR 14 2008

(b)(6)

Recruiting Agents-in-Place from within Terrorist Organizations

Prepared By: The DCI Task Force for Recruitment Strategy

Task Force members:

Brad Moss

Kelly McClanahan

This presentation was written during the Fall 2004 in conjunction with a graduate course in Political Risk Analysis at American University, Washington, DC. The information in the report has not been approved or sanctioned by any agency or organization and is provided as an example of risk analysis and should be treated as such. For more information please contact infomundo@earthlink.net.

Executive Summary

On orders from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), we have been instructed to construct a model which will predict the likelihood of recruiting agents from within terrorist groups by country and to apply this model to eight countries with a pre-existing significant Islamic terrorist presence. The eight countries we have selected are Egypt, Iran, Kazakhstan, Libya, Pakistan, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

To construct this model, we have identified five factor categories, which are comprised of several sub-factors. These five factor categories are weighted differently in relation to significance and are as follows:

- ◆ Terrorist group statistics – 10%
- ◆ People and terrorists – 36%
- ◆ People and the U.S. – 14%
- ◆ People's potential for activism – 20%
- ◆ Wildcards – 20%.

The valuation of the sub-factors is determined through the consideration of several variables, grouped into the following seven categories: Social, Government, Awareness, Religious, Economic, Education, Terrorism.

The results of the application of this model to the aforementioned countries are assessed within the following framework:

- ◆ 80-100 – Highly favorable.
- ◆ 60-79 – Definitely worth the risk. Probability of success significantly outweighs the risk.

- ◆ 50-59 – Somewhat favorable. Probability of success is not significant; proceed with caution.
- ◆ 40-49 – Unfavorable risks or undesirable target. Terrorist presence is not significant enough to warrant the effort, or the inherent risks require extreme care.
- ◆ 39 and below – No reasonable chance of success.

After applying the model to the eight countries, the most favored country for recruitment is Saudi Arabia, with a score of 62, followed closely by Pakistan with a score of 59. We delineate the limitations of our methodology and recommend:

- ◆ That the CIA commission an extensive estimate utilizing these criteria across a wider spectrum of countries.
- ◆ That a “Team B” analysis task force be assigned to investigate the alternative results following the “infiltrator” model of agent recruitment as opposed to the current “case officer” model.
- ◆ That the Directorate of Operations begin investigating possible avenues of implementing the conclusions of this analysis in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

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FAX COVER SHEET

TO 703-613-3007

FROM Kel McClanahan (12406812189)

DATE 4/12/2008

COVER MESSAGE

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